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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law pursuant to , Article \ Ill, Section 
4, of the Utah Constitution. In the instant case, this Court has asserted jurisdiction pursuant to 
Rule 6(c) of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability. Mr. Harding contests this Court's 
JUHMIU'II mi |iiii MI nil In Ihiiilli h|i I  nf llur Rulrs nil! I anv i l I hu/iplint1 IIKI Mi'« i l i i l i ly. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Has Ka> 1 liinliiif.1 I>tfccn i l nnn l iluc pnicrs Il I  i11 h Ihi'i * omul's < hilt'i ol Hrk'rvm v 
dated March 25, 2004 and procedures employed in these proceedings? The question of 
wether statue or rule is constitutional is a question of law. See State v Mohi, {H I I I id 
991, 995 (Utah 1995). 
2 Did the Screening Panel correctly determine the appropriate sanction in this case to be a 
stayed six mc nth si ispension follow eel bj a fh e ) eai period of pre' 
unprecedented order of reference issued by this Court, no appellate standard of review of 
a Screening Panel's recommendation has previously been articulated by an appellate court 
in Utah. This Court would review the factual determinations of a District Court under a 
clearly erroneous standard. In Re Tanner, 960 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1998). The Court 
will give "SITIOII'I utiiisidcnifinir In llm iiilhifis iim1 liirlunl liiiHliii).»s iill Illr JiMipliiiii!', 
court, but the Court will engage in an independent judgement regarding the appropriate 
1990). 
3. Does this Court lack jurisdiction to decide this case given that Mr. Harding has previously 
1 
been subject to discipline by the Judicial Conduct Commission? This issue presents a 
question of law that the Court reviews under a correctness standard. McCoy v. Utah 
Disaster Cleanup, 2003 UT App. 49 f 9. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATION 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Rule 8.4 (a), Rules of Professional Conduct: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to : (a) Violate or attempt to violate the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through acts of 
another. 
Rule 8.4(b), Rules of Professional Conduct: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to :...(b) Commit a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. 
Rule 8.4(d), Rules of Professional Conduct: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:...(d) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to 
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the administration of justice. 
Rule 4.2, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e), 
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the intent to benefit the lawyer or 
another or to deceive the court, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to 
a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes serious or potentially serious 
interference with a legal proceeding; or 
(b) engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which includes 
intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, 
misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, 
distribution, or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of 
another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of 
these offenses; or 
(c) engages in any other intentional misconduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice law. 
Rule 4.3, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
(a) knowingly engages in professional misconduct as defined in Rule 8.4(a), (d), (e) 
or (f) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and causes injury or potential injury to 
a party, the public, or the legal system, or causes interference or potential 
interference with a legal proceedings; or 
(b) engages in criminal conduct that does not contain the elements listed in Standard 
4.2(b) but nevertheless seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice law. 
Rule 6.3, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in 
the degree of discipline to be imposed. Mitigating circumstances may include: 
(a) absence of a prior record of discipline; 
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(b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; 
(c) personal or emotional problems; 
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of the 
misconduct involved; 
(e) full and free disclosure to the client or the disciplinary authority prior to the 
discovery of any misconduct or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
(f) inexperience in the practice of law; 
(g) good character or reputation; 
(g) physical disability; 
(h) mental disability or impairment, including substance abuse when: 
(1) The respondent is affected by a substance abuse or mental disability; and 
(2) The substance abuse or mental disability causally contributed to the 
misconduct; and 
(3) The respondent's recovery from the substance abuse or mental disability is 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation; and 
(4) The recovery arrested the misconduct and the recurrence of that 
misconduct is unlikely; 
(2) unreasonable delay in disciplinary proceedings, provided that the respondent did 
not substantially contribute to the delay and provided further that the respondent 
has demonstrated prejudice resulting from the delay; 
(3) interim reform in circumstances not involving mental disability or impairment; 
(4) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; 
(5) remorse; and 
(6) remoteness of prior offenses. 
Rule 6(c), Lawyer Discipline and Disability: 
A former judge who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
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Supreme Court not only for conduct as a lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred while the 
lawyer was a judge and would have been grounds for lawyer discipline, provided that the 
misconduct was not the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding as to which there has been a 
final determination by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is a review of a Screening Panel recommendation in an 
attorney discipline proceeding. 
Course of the Proceedings: On November 19, 2002, Judge Ray Harding was given 
Notice of Formal Proceedings by the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission ("JCC"). (R. at 52-53). 
Following a hearing before the JCC, on February 12,2003 the JCC issued an "Order of Removal 
from Office" which was forwarded to the Supreme Court for implementation. (R. at 112-113). 
By "Final Order" dated March 25, 2003, the Court noted receipt of the recommendation and 
Judge Harding's resignation letter. The Court ordered Mr. Harding permanently disqualifed from 
serving in any judicial or quasi-judicial position. (R. at 3). Following his removal as a District 
Court Judge, by Order of Reference dated March 25, 2003, this Court ordered the Office of 
Professional Conduct (OPC) to "proceed with a disciplinary review under its ordinary rules, but 
with its conclusions and recommendations regarding [Ray] Harding's license to practice law to 
be submitted directly to this Court for final action." (R. at 1). 
Pursuant to the Court's Order of Reference, a Screening Panel was convened on January 
22, 2004. In accordance with Rules governing Screening Panel Review, neither the OPC nor Mr. 
Harding were permitted cross examination of the witnesses who appeared and gave testimony 
before the Screening Panel. Thus, although Mr. Harding had an opportunity to testify on his own 
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behalf and to present witnesses for questioning by the Screening Panel, he did not have the 
opportunity to cross examine witnesses called by the OPC, nor did he have the opportunity to 
question witnesses called on his own behalf. 
In a seven page Memorandum Recommendation ("Screening Panel Memo."), the 
Screening Panel recommended a six-month stayed suspension followed by a five-year period of 
probation, with conditions including random drug testing and Mr. Harding's continuation of 
rehabilitation programs he was currently in engaged in. 
Statement of Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for Review: Ray Harding is a 
member of the Utah State Bar, licenced to practice before the Courts of this Court since 1978. 
He served a District Court Judge for the Fourth Judicial District from September 1995 until his 
resignation on February 28, 2003. Upon receipt of Mr. Harding's resignation, this Court entered 
its Final Order and imposed the additional sanction that he be permanently disqualified from 
serving in any judicial or quasi judicial position in the State of Utah. (R. at 3). 
On or about July 13, 2002 police were summoned to Mr. Harding's home. At that time 
he was arrested and charged in a two count information with unlawful possession or use of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-27-8 (2)(a)(i) and 
§ 76-2-202, for the knowing and intentional possession or use of controlled substances to wit: 
cocaine and heroine. Mr. Harding subsequently entered pleas of guilty to two counts of 
attempted possession, class A misdemeanors. He was sentenced by the Honorable Timothy 
Hansen to two one-year jail terms, with 120 days of actual incarceration, a fine of $9,250, 500 
hours of community service and 24 months of probation, including individual therapy and 
continuation of the recovery programs he already was involved in. 
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Mr. Harding's ex-wife, Ann Harding, testified before the Screening Panel that she had 
seen Mr. Harding smoking "crack" cocaine and the he had told her he had been using crack and 
heroine since October 2001. According to Ms. Harding, Mr. Harding also told her he had on 
occasion smoked crack in the bathroom of his judicial chambers. Ms. Harding also testified at 
the hearing that Mr. Harding had been on a drug binge for approximately three weeks prior to the 
July 13, 2002 incident. The Screening Panel found Ms. Harding's testimony to be not credible 
and contrary to other evidence presented. Specifically, the Panel rejected the notion that Mr. 
Harding had used drugs within his chambers. The alleged act was not witnessed by anyone and 
Mr. Harding denied that such had ever occurred. Additionally, other judges, Judge Claudia 
Laycock and Judge Fred Howard, who had close contact with Mr. Harding testified before the 
Screening Panel that they never saw any evidence of drug use by him while in the courthouse. 
Mr. Harding's in-court clerk, Shauna Young Woodward, testified that she never witnessed any 
drug abuse or behavior indicating drug use in the Court nor in his chambers. She further testified 
that the door to his chambers remained open at all times except when he closed the door in 
meetings with his wife or counsel. She further testified that she detected nothing in his conduct 
indicating drug use nor did she ever smell anything which would indicate drug use within his 
chambers. The Screening Panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Ray Harding did 
not use drugs in the courthouse while acting as a judge. (Screening Panel Memo, at 3) Other 
attorneys also testified before the Screening Panel that when they appeared in front of Mr. 
Harding, they never observed behavior indicative of drug use. 
The Screening Panel found that Mr. Harding's decision to violate the law and use illegal 
drugs was "an intentional act" which violated Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
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(Screening Panel Memo, at 2) The Panel concluded, however, that there was no violation of 
Rule 8.4(a), 8.4(c), or 8.4(d). (Screening Panel Memo, at 6) 
In it's Notice of Informal Complaint, the OPC alleged Mr. Harding may have violated 
Rule 8.4(b) based on a charge of poaching. The Screening Panel found there to be no evidence in 
support of a finding of probable cause regarding the poaching charge. Indeed the Panel found the 
only evidence of the alleged crime came from the testimony of his ex-wife who the Panel found 
to be not credible. 
The Screening Panel's Recommended Discipline 
The Screening Panel determined that Mr. Harding's decision to violate the law and use 
illegal drugs was an intentional act, in violation of Rule 8.4(b) in that it was " a criminal act that 
reflects adversely of a lawyer's... fitness as a lawyer." (Screening Panel Memo, at 2) The Panel 
determined that the presumptive sanction for Mr. Harding's violation of Rule 8.4(b) was 
suspension pursuant to Rule 4.3, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. That Rule makes 
suspension the presumptive sanction when "a lawyer: (a) knowingly engages in professional 
misconduct...and causes injury or potential injury to... the public, or the legal system, or causes 
interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding." (Screening Panel Memo, at 2, 
quoting Rule 4.3, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions) 
The Screening Panel next considered mitigating circumstances pursuant to Rule 6.3, 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.l The Screening Panel focused on Rule 6.3(i), Mental 
Disability or Impairment, Including Substance Abuse. The Screening Panel set out in detail the 
1
 While the Screening Panel Memo does not explicitly state as much, it appears that the 
Screening Panel did not find any aggravating circumstances pursuant to Rule 6.2, Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. 
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steps Mr. Harding has taken to accomplish "a meaningful and sustained period of successful 
rehabilitation," a requirement for mitigation pursuant to Rule 6.3(i). The Panel noted that Mr. 
Harding had completed a 90 day inpatient treatment at the Betty Ford Clinic where he was 
regularly tested for drugs. The Panel considered the testimony of Mr. Harding, his sponsor, his 
after care counselor, his defense attorney, his daughters and the Director of the Utah State Bar 
Lawyers Helping Lawyers Program, all to the effect that Mr. Harding's recovery had been both 
sincere and successful. The Panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Harding had 
been completely drug free for a period lasting eighteen (18) months. Based on the evidence 
received, the Panel observed that the likelihood of his remaining drug free was over 95%. 
(Screening Panel Memo, at 4) 
The Screening Panel also found significant the fact that Mr. Harding had voluntarily 
refrained from the practice of law. According to the Panel, Mr. Harding's withdrawal from the 
practice indicated the seriousness with which he had taken the violations and a manifestation of 
his commitment to changing his life. The Panel was impressed with Mr. Harding's candor in 
acknowledging that he will remain vulnerable to the return of drug abuse for the remainder of his 
life and that his success would be measured by his commitment to remaining "clean and sober." 
The Panel recognized Mr. Harding's continued involvement in the 12 Step Program and in 
Lawyers Helping Lawyers, his demonstration of an ongoing determination to remain drug free 
and his vigilance in overcoming his addiction. Based on that, the Panel conclude that he had 
accomplished a "meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation" and that he 
qualified under Rule 6.3(i) for mitigation of his punishment under the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyers Sanctions. (Screening Panel Memo, at 5) 
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Based on the Screening Panel's conclusion that the presumptive sanction for Mr. 
Harding's violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct was suspension pursuant 
to Rule 4.3(a) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and its conclusion that the 
presumptive sanction should be modified by the mitigation factor of substance abuse for mental 
disability pursuant to Rule 6.3(i), the Screening Panel recommended that Mr. Harding be 
suspended for a period of six months with that suspension stayed and that he be placed on 
probation for a period of five years. (Screening Panel Mem. at 1, 5-6) The Panel recommended 
that Mr. Harding be permitted to continue his practice of law and that the conditions of his 
probation included random drug testing, costs of which to be borne by Mr. Harding, and that Mr. 
Harding be required to participate in a 12-Step program on an on-going basis, at least monthly, 
for the entire period of probation. (Screening Panel Memo, at 5-6) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The procedure adopted by this Court for reviewing Mr. Harding's case has resulted in a 
denial of due process. Because Mr. Harding was never afforded the opportunity to litigate this 
case in district court, he has been denied a forum in which to adequately present his case. 
Further, and most significantly, he has been denied the opportunity to confront and cross examine 
witnesses against him. 
If the Court proceeds to the merits of this case, the Screening Panel's decision should be 
treated as a final order, subject to the same standard of review. Evidence in the record supports 
the Panel's conclusion that suspension pursuant to Rule 4.3 of the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions is the appropriate presumptive sanction. Further, the Panel correctly 
determined that the sanction is subject to mitigation under Rule 6.3(i) due to Mr. Harding's 
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substance abuse. 
Finally, and most significantly this Court lacks jurisdiction to conduct these proceedings. 
Mr. Harding was subject to a "judicial disciplinary proceeding!]" and "a final determination by 
the Supreme Court," which resulted in his removal as a judge and his permanent disqualification 
to hold judicial office. Pursuant to Rule 6(c), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to impose further sanctions. Mr. Harding already has been subject to 
discipline and further discipline is neither warranted nor permitted under Rule6(c). 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court's Order of Reference and Direct Review of the Screening Panel's 
Recommendation Has Denied Ray Harding Due Process and Equal 
Protection Under the Law 
Every attorney licensed to practice law in Utah has a property right in that license and is 
entitled to due process before that right is taken away. Because Ray Harding was denied a full 
and fair hearing, including the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him, he has been 
denied the right of due process and any action taken against his license is unconstitutional. 
In Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), the petitioner had been denied 
admission to the New York State Bar because of an adverse report by a committee of attorneys 
appointed by the Appellate Division to investigate and report on the character and fitness of the 
applicants. Willner was denied admission to the bar, but he was never afforded a hearing. The 
United States Supreme Court held that "[a] State cannot exclude a person from the practice of 
law or from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 102. The right is not "a matter of 
grace and favor." Id. The Court held further that "the need for confrontation is a necessary 
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conclusion from the requirements of procedural due process in a situation such as this." Id2 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), involved a civil 
servant's claim that he was entitled to an administrative hearing prior to being terminated for 
cause. The petitioner was a security guard hired by the Board of Education. It was discovered 
that he had lied on his job application regarding a prior criminal conviction for larceny. He was 
terminated without an opportunity to respond to the dishonesty charge or to challenge the 
dismissal. The Court addressed the right vested in a public employee by the State: "While the 
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not 
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate 
procedural safeguards." Id. at 541. The Court concluded that "an essential principal" of due 
process is that a deprivation of life, liberty or property be "preceded with notice and opportunity 
for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Id. at 542. 
The Utah Court of Appeals addressed the issue of pre-termination rights in Tolman v. Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The claimant in Tolman was an 
investigator for the Salt Lake County Attorney, who had been terminated for "continuing 
misconduct and acts inimical to the public service." Id. at 24. The County Career Services 
Council upheld termination of Tolman based on hearsay evidence of a witness who did not 
appear at the termination hearing. The court held that "[a]ll parties must be fully apprised of the 
evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given the opportunity to cross-examine 
2The Utah Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law." Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. A license to practice law, much 
like a business license, represents a property interest which "should not be disrupted without 
following fundamental standards of due process of law." Dairy Prod. Serv. v. City ofWellsville, 
2000UT81,f48. 
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witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way 
can a party maintain its right to make its defense." Id. at 29 (quoting Department ofComm. 
Affairs v. Utah Merit Syst. Council 614 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah 1980)).3 
Taken together, these cases stand for the unremarkable proposition that a license to 
practice law is a property right conferred by the State which cannot be taken without due process 
of law. The process due an attorney facing potential suspension or disbarment is a fair hearing 
before an impartial arbiter, notice of the claims asserted, the right to call witnesses in his or her 
behalf, and significantly, the opportunity to confront and cross examine the witnesses against the 
attorney. Absent such procedural safeguards, attorney discipline is constitutionally infirm and 
the very public trust we seek to preserve is undermined. 
Under the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, these procedural safeguards are 
preserved. The Screening Panel's role in lawyer discipline, much like a grand jury, is to 
determine whether probable cause exists to refer the case for formal discipline. The panel has 
limited sanctioning authority to issue a letter of caution, an admonishment, or to issue a public 
reprimand. The panel is not empowered, however, to impose any sanction that would result in 
public discipline, suspension or disbarment. See Rule 10(b)(5), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and 
Disability. Those sanctions may only be imposed after a formal referral and district court 
proceeding. Id. Rule 11. Thus, minor violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct are 
3See also D.B. v. Division of Occupational & Prof. Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing the opportunity to challenge the truthfulness of testimony "is even 
more important where the evidence consists of the testimony of individuals whose memory might 
be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, 
intolerance, or jealousy. We have formalized these protections in the requirement of 
confrontation and cross-examination. They have ancient roots."). 
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efficiently dealt with by the Screening Panels while more serious violations are forwarded on for 
formal proceedings before the district court. Accordingly, when the lawyer's license is placed in 
substantial jeopardy, due process demands, and the current system provides, a formal trial with 
all accompanying protections. 
In this case, Ray Harding was denied the right to a trial, he was denied the right to 
examine his own witnesses, and he was denied the right to cross-examine those witnesses against 
him. Thus, in Mr. Harding's case, the procedural protections built into the disciplinary process 
were short circuited, thereby resulting in a violation of his right to due process of law. Pursuant 
to Rule 10, Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability, neither the Attorney nor the Complainant 
have the right to examine or cross-examine witnesses-that function is reserved for the Screening 
Panel. In this case, the OPC called Mr. Harding's ex-wife, Anne Harding, as its first and only 
witness. However, the OPC submitted numerous hearsay documents which would not have been 
admissible had the case been tried in district court. For example, the OPC forced Mr. Harding to 
produce the Pre-sentence Report prepared by Adult Probation and Parol in his criminal case, 
under threat that his failure to provide the same could constitute a separate professional offense. 
The OPC then made that report part of the record. Similarly, the OPC incorporated no fewer 
than 21 newspaper articles detailing various aspects of Mr. Harding's criminal cases. These 
documents never would have been admitted by a district court. Yet, Mr. Harding had no 
opportunity to rebut this evidence. 
The decision to suspend or terminate an attorney's ability to practice his or her chosen 
profession is nothing short of monumental, having a significant impact not only on the attorney, 
but also his or her family, the legal community and the community at large. By Constitutional 
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dictate, such a decision can only be made after giving the attorney the chance at vindication 
through a fair and open adversarial proceeding. That simply did not happen in this case. 
II. Given the Procedure Adopted by the Court, the Screening Panel's 
Recommendation is Entitled to the Same Deference Given a District Court 
Judgment 
If this matter were before the Court on appeal from a district court judgment, the Court 
would review the factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard, while reserving the right to 
draw different inferences from the facts than those drawn by the district court. In re Ince, 957 
P.2d 1233,1236 (Utah 1998); In re Pendelton, 11 P.3d 284,291 (Utah 2000).With regard to the 
discipline actually imposed, the Court will review the determination for correctness. In re Ince, 
957 P.2d at 1236. Given that this Court, by its Order of Reference, bypassed the district court, it 
is left with the factual determinations made by the Screening Panel, which should be reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard. Id. 
The Screening Panel made two significant factual determinations. First, the Panel found 
the testimony of Mr. Harding's ex-wife Anne to be not credible. (Screening Panel Memo, at 2, 4, 
6) The Panel accorded much weight to the testimony of Mr. Harding's former in-court clerk and 
his fellow judges that they never saw any evidence of drug use at work. Thus, the Panel 
concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Harding did not use drugs in the 
courthouse while acting as a judge. (Screening Panel Memo, at 3) 
Second, the Panel found evidence of Mr. Harding's recovery from the substance abuse 
demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation. (Screening 
Panel Memo, at 5) Specifically, the Panel cited the testimony of Mr. Harding, his daughters, his 
aftercare counselor, his sponsor, his defense attorney and the head of Lawyers Helping Lawyers 
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to the effect that he had been drug free for a period of 18 months. The Panel also found credible 
evidence that Mr. Harding was over 95% likely to remain drug free. (Screening Panel Memo, at 
4). Based on these findings, the Panel concluded that Mr. Harding had satisfied Rule 6.3(i) of the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and therefore qualified for mitigation under that Rule. 
A. The Presumptive Sanction is Suspension 
The Panel concluded that Mr. Harding's decision to violate the law was an intentional act, 
in violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, thereby subjecting him to 
discipline. The Panel determined that the appropriate sanction was suspension under Rule 4.3, 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The Panel determined that Mr. Harding had 
knowingly engaged in professional misconduct, causing injury or potential injury to the public, or 
the legal system, or causing interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. 
(Screening Panel Memo, at 2) The Panel did not find applicable Rule 4.2's presumptive sanction 
of disbarment. 
The OPC has argued that Mr. Harding must necessarily have solicited the controlled 
substances he used, thereby subjecting him to disbarment under of Rule 4.2(b). This 
interpretation of Rule 4.2(b), however, is erroneous. By its terms, Rule 4.2(b) applies to those 
engaged in "the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances," or "an attempt or 
conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses." There is no evidence that 
Mr. Harding ever solicited any person to sell, distribute or import a controlled substance and the 
OPC is attempting to state as fact a tangential inference. If the crime of solicitation could be 
inferred from mere possession of a controlled substance, then every criminal prosecution for 
possession would properly include a charge of solicitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-403. 
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That simply is not the case and the OPC's suggestion that this case warrants special treatment is 
another example of the inequitable treatment Mr. Harding is receiving. The appropriate 
presumptive sanction, as determined by the Panel, is suspension. 
B. Mitigating Circumstances Warrant a Departure from the 
Presumptive Sanction in this Case 
Pursuant to Rule 3.1(d) Standards of Lawyer Sanctions, in determining appropriate 
sanctions, the Court (or, in this case the Screening Panel) should consider the existence of 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The Panel found no aggravating circumstances and one 
mitigating circumstance-that Mr. Harding was affected by a substance abuse. Rule 6.3(i), 
Standards of Lawyer Sanctions; see also Screening Panel Memo, at 3-5. This conclusion is 
amply supported by the evidence before the panel. (Screening Panel Memo, at 4-5) 
1. Departure for Substance Abuse or Mental Disability is Warranted in 
this Case 
In In Re Ince, this Court held that "[t]o justify a departure from the presumptive level of 
discipline set forth in the Standards, the aggravating and mitigating factors must be significant." 
957 P.2d at 1237-38. In this case, the mitigating factor of substance abuse not only is significant, 
it is the basis for Mr. Harding's discipline in the first instance. Thus, it would be incongruent to 
base bar discipline against Mr. Harding on the basis of a substance abuse problem while also 
finding that same problem is not significant in considering mitigation. The question is not 
whether the factor is significant in this case, the question is whether Mr. Harding satisfies the 
four requirements of the mitigating factor articulated in Rule 6.3(i). The Screening Panel found 
that he did and this Court is urged to affirm that finding. 
First, there is no question that the substance abuse contributed to the misconduct. Rule 
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6.3(i)(l). Mr. Harding's criminal conduct flowed directly from his addiction. Second, the 
substance abuse causally contributed to the misconduct. Id. 6.3(i)(2). Again, the substance 
abuse was the reason Mr. Harding engaged in the criminal conduct of possessing and using 
controlled substances. Third, as discussed above, the Panel found ample evidence that Mr. 
Harding's recovery from the substance abuse is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained 
period of successful rehabilitation. Id. 6.3(i)(3). Significantly, unrebutted evidence before the 
Panel established that given his period of sobriety and his continuing efforts at relapse 
prevention, he is more than 95% likely to remain drug free. (Screening Panel Memo, at 4) 
Finally, Mr. Harding's recovery has unquestionably arrested the misconduct and the recurrence 
of that misconduct is unlikely. Id. at 6.3(i)(4). For these reasons, the mitigating factor of 
substance abuse is significant and should be considered by this Court. 
2. Other Departures Under Rule 6.3 Are Warranted 
Although the Screening Panel did not address any of the other mitigating circumstances 
set forth in Rule 6.3, several apply to this case. First, Mr. Harding does not have a prior 
disciplinary record. Id. 6.3(a). Mr. Harding has been an attorney for over 25 years and he served 
as a judge since 1995. During that time, he has not been the subject of bar discipline. Indeed, he 
has exemplified ethics and competence. This is a significant factor. 
Second, nothing in the record suggests that he was acting out of any dishonest or selfish 
motive. Id. 6.3(b). Mr. Harding has an addiction; during the time he was using, he was not 
acting in selfish pursuit of gratification, but rather he was fighting with a destructive illness. 
Coupled with his remarkable rehabilitation and recovery, this factor is significant. 
Third, testimony before the Screening Panel and letters submitted on his behalf very 
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plainly established Mr. Harding's good character and reputation. The OPC has taken the position 
f
 the testimon> of these character witnesses is entitled to lit tie w eight 'unless Mr. Harding can 
demonstrate that they knew the full extent of his misconduct. See OPC Screening Panel Memo. 
at 14-15 (citing In re Ince, 957 P.2d at 1238-39). Given the extensive media coverage of every 
aspect of this case-including the 21 news articles the OPC attached to its N lemo it is i inrealistic 
to assert that anyone familiar with Mr. Harding and this case does not klnow the full extent of his 
misconduct Such o\ ei w helmii lg testimony to 1"\ li 1 Iarding"s character and reputation is 
significant. 
These mitigating factors support the Screening Panel 's downward departure, staying the 
six-month suspension and imposing a term, of probation 
III. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over this Proceeding 
I *ui suanttc • R ule 6(c) of the R ules of I .aw y ei Discipline arid Disability, "[a] former judge 
who has resumed the status of a lawyer is subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court not 
only for conduct as a lawyer but also for misconduct that occurred when the lawyer was a judge 
and would have been grounds for lawyer discipline . . . " At first blusl I, this w oi lid appear to 
govern these proceedings. The Rule goes on, however, to carve out an exception: "provided that 
the miscondi ict w as not the subject of a judicial disciplinary proceeding as to which there has 
been a final determination by the Supreme Court." By its express language, Rule 6(c) grants 
jurisdiction to the Judicial Conduct Commission to order sanctions against a sitting judge, upon 
implementation by the Court. 
In this case, after a hearing, the Commission entered an Order removing Mr. Harding 
from office, to be effective ti pop implementation In l lnsl 'ourl Svv U M I 1'•« I l'» Bdor t ' lln'< 
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Court implemented the Order, however, Mr. Harding resigned. By its "Final Order" of March 
25, 2003, this Court acknowledged Mr. Harding's resignation, but went on to impose the 
additional sanction that he be permanently disqualified from holding any judicial or quasi-
judicial position in the State of Utah. R. at 3. Thus, although Mr. Harding resigned, there has 
nevertheless been "judicial disciplinary proceeding^" and "a final determination by the Supreme 
Court" of his removal/resignation and permanent disqualification. 
Accordingly, jurisdiction to sanction Mr. Harding rests with the JCC, not the OPC and 
not this Court. The JCC imposed ins most severe sanction of removal and this Court finalized 
that Order, and imposed the further sanction that Mr. Harding be forever barred from holding 
judicial office. Mr. Harding already has been sanctioned and further sanction pursuant to the 
Rules of Lawyer Discipline is both unwarranted and impermissible under Rule 6(c). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Harding respectfully requests that the Court dismiss this 
case. In the alternative, Mr. Harding requests that the Court adopt the findings and conclusions 
of the Screening Panel imposing a six-month suspension, to be stayed and a five-year period of 
probation, to include random drug testing and participation in a 12-step program on an on-going 
basis, at least monthly. 
DATED thisrL_ day of April, 2004 
/ 
!s &/CASTON 
/ 
*v 
Gregory G/Skordas 
Jack M. Morgan, Jr. 
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